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‘Notwithstanding its limitations, the theory of comparative advantage is one of the
deepest truths in all of economics.’ (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998, p. 696). The
point, however, is that this truth derives more evidence from the common sense of a
simple barter model and less from a theory in the proper sense:
The undefined and defined terms, the axioms, and all the theorems that
can be derived from them constitute a theory. (Stigum, 1991, p. 36)
Seen from the methodological perspective the theory of comparative advantage
cannot stand alone but must be part of a comprehensive framework that combines the
interaction of real and nominal variables for the economy as a whole. Exemplifying
his case with a convincing example that compares the respective labor inputs of two
countries caused some trouble for Ricardo because the theory of international value
‘really rips up the entire fabric of Ricardo’s theory of value’ (Schumpeter, 1994,
p. 612). If one takes the formal definition of theory literally Ricardo advanced a
rudimentary piece. The task would have been to derive the theorem of comparative
advantage from a consistent set of axioms for the economy as a whole. To proceed
in this way was clearly not the first priority of Political Economics.
Since advocacy of free-trade policy was the main practical purpose
the ‘classical’ writers had in mind when they developed their theory of
international values, they were naturally more interested in displaying
the ‘gains’ that accrue to a nation from foreign trade. (Schumpeter,
1994, p. 609)
General equilibrium theory, in marked contrast to Ricardo’s approach, explicitly
complies to the formal definition of theory (Debreu, 1959, p. x). Its first drawback,
though, is that it rests on a set of behavioral axioms (Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p.
v). Its second drawback is the irresistible bias to explain the fact of long running
positive profits away:
Wherever entrepreneurs make profits (beyond the market return on
their own land, labor, and capital) they expand production; wherever
they incur losses, production is contracted. In equilibrium therefore,
there are neither profits nor losses. Walras thus created the abstraction
of the zero-profit entrepreneur under perfect competition. (Niehans,
1994, p. 214)
This bias prevents deeper insights into the nature and function of profit. The zero-
profit situation is a convenient analytical limiting case but evidently no feature of
the real world. Hence, the long term existence of positive profits for the economy as
a whole has to be explained first. In the second step profit has to be made an integral
part of the theory of international trade.
Ricardo’s line of thought ran in real terms. His principle of comparative advan-
tage is, after a long hibernation, ‘back to center stage’ (Eaton and Kortum, 2012, p.
66). The new approaches expand Ricardo’s simple model by introducing concepts
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drawn from general equilibrium theory, thereby implicitly carrying over its basic
its assumptions. Taking the widespread critique of GET seriously this is hardly a
promising line of inquiry. In the aforementioned reference the term profit – the
pivot of the market economy – does not appear once.
The present paper starts from a entirely new foundation. Its general thesis says
that human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization
of the money economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. The methodological
case for structural axiomatization has been made at length elsewhere (2012).
It is the specific purpose of this paper to reformulate the notion of comparative
advantage consistently in structural axiomatic terms and to see whether this yields
answers to some unsettled questions of theoretical economics.
The formal ground is prepared in Section 1. In Section 2 profit is defined
in terms of the axiomatic variables. In Sections 3 to 6 three elementary cases
are compared with regard to the required adaptations of prices and wage rates in
consequence of the merger of two regions: (A) two regions, two products, (B) two
regions, equal productivities, different wage rates and prices, and (C) two regions,
equal wage rates, different productivities and prices. The criterion for necessary
adaptations is that the pre- and post-merger situations are indifferent in real terms.
In Section 7 the elementary cases are formally combined to the classical case of
comparative advantage. In Section 8 it is shown that the merger of the two regions
ultimately leaves business and workers unaffected in all real aspects. In Section 9
the consequences of factor immobility are considered. Section 10 summarizes.
1 Axioms and definitions
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at
first one world economy, one firm, and one product.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income,
i.e. the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production conditions. The 2nd
axiom should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
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Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other state activity.
The simplicity of our theory summarized in axioms and describing all
possible configurations is therefore dearly bought. Except in case of
a miniature theory . . . , the implications are difficult to see by merely
examining the axioms. . . . Via the axioms information is by a large
provided implicitly. A theory is a logical filing system. That which is
delivered enveloped in axioms must be carefully retrieved by means of
deduction. (Klant, 1984, p. 10)
Albeit quite obvious, it is worth to re-emphasize that all axiomatic variables are
measurable in principle. No nonempirical concepts like equilibrium, rationality or
perfect competition are put into the premises.
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side
of the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). With (4) wage income YW and distributed profit income
YD is defined as:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
With (5) the expenditure ratio ρE and the sales ratio ρX is defined as:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
|t. (5)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures are equal
to income, or, in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced. A
value of ρX = 1 of the sales ratio means that the quantities produced and sold are
equal in period t or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
The economic meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What
deserves mention is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and dis-
tributed profit and not of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit have
to be thoroughly kept apart.
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2 Profit
The business sector’s profit in period t is defined with (6) as the difference be-
tween the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :1
∆Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (6)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical
with that of the theory of the firm:
∆Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t. (7)
Using the first axiom (1) and the definitions (4) one gets
∆Q f i ≡C−Y +YD |t. (8)
The three definitions are formally equivalent. If distributed profit YD is set to
zero then profit or loss of the business sector is determined solely by expenditures
and income. For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption
expenditures C have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW . So
that profit comes into existence in the pure consumption economy the household
sector must run a deficit at least in one period. This in turn makes the inclusion of
the financial sector mandatory. A theory that does not include at least one bank that
supports the concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential features of
the market economy (cf. Keynes, 1973, p. 85). Mention should be made that neither
classicals, nor neoclassicals, nor Keynesians ever came to grips with profit (Desai,
2008, p. 10), (Tómasson and Bezemer, 2010).2
3 Case A: two regions, two products
We have at first two regions M and N, respectively. Each region consists of one firm
A and B, respectively. The inhabitants of region M buy at first only the product of
firm A; the inhabitants of region N buy only the product of firm B.
Total income in each region follows from (1) and is given by:
YM ≡WALA +DANA︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
YN ≡WBLB +DBNB︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
Y = YM +YN
|t. (9)
1 Profits from changes in the value of nonfinancial assets are neglected here, i.e. the condition of
market clearing O = X holds throughout. For details about changes of inventory see (2011c, p. 5).
2 For the full implications of the difference between profit and distributed profit in (8) see (2011a)
and (2011d).
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To simplify matters, distributed profits are set to zero.
Consumption expenditures in each region follow from (3) and are given by:
CM ≡ PAXA
CN ≡ PBXB
C =CM +CN
|t. (10)
Each firm’s financial profit follows from (7) and is given by:
∆Q f iA ≡ PAXA−WALA
∆Q f iB ≡ PBXB−WBLB |t. (11)
This can, under the condition that both product markets are cleared, i.e. ρX = 1,
be rewritten as:
∆Q f iA = PARALA
(
1− WA
PARA
)
if ρXA = 1
∆Q f iB = PBRBLB
(
1− WB
PBRB
)
if ρXB = 1
|t. (12)
In the initial period profits of both firms are set to zero, i.e. the factor cost ratio
ρF ≡ WPR |t (13)
is unity for each firm. Under the zero profit condition follows from (11) that
wage income is equal to consumption expenditures. With the zero profit condition
the market clearing prices for both firms are determined as:
PA =
WA
RA
PB =
WB
RB
|t. (14)
The prices are, in the simplest case, equal to the respective unit wage costs.
Note that no subjective element enters the price determination. The three objective
conditions: market clearing, budget balancing, and zero profit are sufficient. Any
additional behavioral condition, e.g. utility or profit maximization, amounts to
formal over-determination. There is no spare room for the marginal principle.
We now merge the two regions. The inhabitants of M may also buy product B,
and the inhabitants of N may also buy product A. The opportunity set expands. For
the households in M that give up XAΘ and buy XBΘ there must be households in N
that give up XBΘ and buy XAΘ. Any complementary combination is feasible. The
quantities traded are determined by that region that is not prepared to give up as
much as the other would like to exchange. Total consumption expenditures (10) for
both regions taken together remain unaltered:
C =CM+CN ⇒ C = PA (XA−XAΘ)+PBXBΘ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+PB (XB−XBΘ)+PAXAΘ︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
|t. (15)
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Therefore it holds:
PAXAΘ = PBXBΘ |t. (16)
Both regions’ current accounts are balanced. Under the given conditions it is
of no consequence whether the traded quantities are large or small; the necessary
condition is that they are complementary.
From (14) follow the terms of trade:
ρΘ ≡ PAPB ⇒ ρΘ ≡
WA
RA
WB
RB
≡ WA
WB
RB
RA
|t. (17)
The terms of trade are determined by relative wage rates and inverse produc-
tivities. For each unit of product A that the inhabitants of M give up they can buy
more of XB if the wage rate WA is higher relative to WB and if the productivity RB is
higher relative to RA. Vice versa for N. Only if the wage rates happen to be equal,
the terms of trade do not depend on the ratio of nominal magnitudes but solely on
the ratio of productivities. Alternatively, the region with the higher wage rate has
better terms of trade relative to the benchmark of real magnitudes. By introducing
an exchange rate the effect of different nominal wage rates can be neutralized.
For the firms the merging of regions does not change much; only the composition
of customers is now more mixed. Profits are zero before and after the merger. The
households enjoy a greater variety of choice and are, on this score, clearly better off.
The real wages that follow from (14), i.e. WA/PA = RA respectively WB/PB = RB,
are different (to be precise: numerically and qualitatively different) and remain
unaltered. This difference is of no behavioral consequence if it is outweighed by
the possibly greater noneconomic benefits of staying in the home region.
Equation (17) looks rather Ricardian as it makes no explicit reference to demand.
What happens if the inhabitants of the merged regions develop a stronger taste for
product A?
Total consumption expenditures are partitioned in the relation:
CM
CN
=
CM
Y
CN
Y
=
ρEM
ρEN
with C =CM +CN ⇒ ρE ≡ ρEM +ρEN |t.
(18)
From this in combination with (10) and (11) then follows under the zero profit
condition:
LA
LB
=
WB
WA
ρE
ρEM
−1
with L≡ LA +LB constant and ρE = 1 |t.
(19)
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The condition of overall budget balancing translates into ρE = 1. With the wage
rates given, a relative increase of consumption expenditures in favor of product A
amounts to an increase of ρEM. And this in turn necessitates according to (19) a
reallocation of total labor input L. An increase of LA in firm A and a complementary
decrease of LB entails a migration of labor form region N to M. Thereby output
adapts to the change of preferences which expresses itself as an increase of the
expenditure ratio ρEM and a complementary decrease of ρEN. The stronger demand
for one product is adequately satisfied by a shift of production.
This change of tastes and the consequent adaptation of production, though,
does not alter the terms of trade (17), which depend on unvaried productivities and
unvaried wage rates. Hence demand shifts are, contrary to J. S. Mill and Marshall
(Niehans, 1994, pp. 131, 242), (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 608), neutral with regard to
the terms of trade. The partitioning of total nominal demand determines the structure
of production. This follows without regress to any behavioral assumptions from the
axiom set and the rules of algebra. The usual demand–supply analysis is inadequate
because it ignores the interconnections between consumption expenditures and
income. These interconnections are determined by the objective conditions of
market clearing, budget balancing and zero profits. Therefore there is no room left
for independent demand and supply schedules.
4 Case B: equal productivities, different wage rates and prices
The set-up that is given with equations (9) to (12) remains the same with one
exception. It is assumed now that the productivities are equal in both regions. The
wage rates differ. For the qualitatively identical output we then have, compared to
(14), the following new market clearing prices:
RA = RB = R ⇒ PA = WAR PB =
WB
R
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t.
(20)
If the wage rate is higher in region M, i.e. WA >WB, then the market clearing
price is higher, i.e. PA > PB, and M is the high wage–high price region. Real wages
WA/PA and WB/PB are equal to productivity R.
There is an obvious incentive for the inhabitants of M to buy the qualitatively
identical product at a lower price in region N. This one-sidedness would derange the
initial autonomy of the two regions. To fix this behavioral bias, different currencies
are introduced. With an exchange rate of 2 M/N the incentive vanishes, if, for
example, wage rate and price in M are double of that in N. At this exchange rate
there occurs neither supply nor demand and by consequence no transaction in the
foreign exchange market. Each region is supposed to buy its own product.
If the exchange rate is not fixed at 2 M/N but at, for example, 0.49 N/M then there
arises a small incentive for the inhabitants of region N to buy in M. It is assumed
that those and all other remaining small incentives are swamped by transport costs,
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thus no trade takes place in the clear-cut initial state. The high wage–high price
and the low wage–low price regions at first simply coexist. A lower wage rate
and a lower price do not per se set up an advantage. The nominal differentials are
equalized by the exchange rate, which in this case does not ‘clear’ the market but
prevents any trade between the regions. If wage rate and price double in region M
then the exchange rate doubles without any transfer of goods between the regions
or any transaction on the foreign exchange market. The specie flow mechanism
remains inactive. The exchange rate operates as an inhibitor of trade.
We now merge the two regions. This calls for the equalization of the product
prices. From (2), (10) and (3) follows:
P? =
C
X
= PA
LA
L
+PB
LB
L
if ρX = 1, with C =CM +CN, X ≡ XA +XB, L≡ LA +LB |t.
(21)
If both regions are of equal size, measured in labor input, then the new market
clearing price is located exactly in the middle between the formerly higher price of
region M and the lower price of region N. In the general case, the new price is a
weighted average that depends on the relative size of the regions. The price in M
decreases, i.e. P∗ < PA , the price in N increases, i.e. P∗ > PB. The inhabitants of N
are momentarily worse off, and the inhabitants of M are momentarily better off.
Profit was hitherto zero for both firms. Equations (11) change to:
∆Q f iA ≡ P?XA−WA LA
∆Q f iB ≡ P?XB−WB LB |t. (22)
With a lower selling price P? firm A now posts a loss; firm B on the other hand
makes a profit. Firm A is momentarily worse off, and firm B is better off. The
situation of households and firms is inverted in each region. In order to restore the
zero profit state it follows from (20) that the wage rates have to change according
to:
W ?A = P
?R =W ?B if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (23)
After the product price equalization the wage rates in both firms cannot remain
different. This entails that the wage rate falls in firm A, i.e. W ?A < WA, and rises
in firm B, i.e. W ?B > WB. The real wages remain unvaried. Total income Y , too,
remains unchanged. This can be shown with the help of (23), (21) and (20):
Y ? =W ?A LA +W
?
B LB = Y |t. (24)
At the end of the day nothing has changed in real terms. How could the
necessary, but ultimately indifferent, price and wage rate changes be brought about?
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5 Auctioneer vs. invisible hand
For the Walrasian auctioneer the task is simple. There is no need for a tâtonnement,
the auctioneer can calculate the new price vector under the given objective conditions
from the given data. All that is necessary is a simultaneous implementation that
keeps the agents at the same position on their indifference curves. Since agents
are supposed to reckon in real terms, firm A accepts a price reduction while its
workers accept a wage rate reduction. Firm B accepts a price increase and its
workers a wage rate increase. It is not the case that firm B accepts the price increase
but rejects the wage increase. And it is not the case that firm A accepts the wage
rate reduction but rejects the price reduction. There is no cherry picking. All
this is implied in the assumption of economic rationality which in turn implies
the simultaneous execution of all nominal changes. Simultaneity presupposes a
coordinating central agency (Nadal, 2004, p. 108). Implementation presupposes no
extra-market authority provided the agents rationally accept the indifferent nominal
changes as determined by the auctioneer.
For the invisible hand the task is more demanding because it has to rely on
market forces that effect the price and wage rate changes by means of quantitative
changes of supply and demand. The invisible hand is not allowed to touch prices.
After the regions’ merger in Case B it initially pays for firm B to transport part
of its output to region M and sell it there. According to the logic of market forces,
this will drive down the price in M and drive up the price in N. As long as this
process continues firm B makes a profit and firm A faces accumulating inventories
and losses. It is implicitly assumed that the price adaptation process ends before
firm A goes bankrupt. Firm A’s skill to stay afloat therefore specifies the notion of
the long run. Bankruptcy of firm A is not an indicator that the markets work properly
and in good Darwinist fashion merely weed out the weak and sick firms, just the
contrary; in the case under consideration it is the very epitome of inefficiency.
Since firm A’s situation at first deteriorates after the price equalization it has
a strong motive and cogent arguments to effect wage cuts. In order to save jobs
workers can be expected to acquiesce more or less rapidly. In the meantime,
losses accumulate. Firm B, on the other hand, will be slow to raise its wage rate
and rather prefer to expand its profitable business by hiring more workers. This
subjectively rational procrastination, though, is not conductive to satisfying results
for the economy as a whole. Since financial profit for the merged economy is zero
by construction the situation is behaviorally unstable as long profit in one firm is
positive, because there is a complementary loss in the other firm. What is needed,
then, is full downward and upward flexibility of product prices and wage rates. This
perfect behavioral symmetry is no feature of the real world. In the limiting case of
symmetry and simultaneity no resources consuming reallocation of goods and labor
input would be necessary in order to arrive at an economically indifferent end state.
The invisible hand’s clumsy and wasteful quantitative adaptations are an inferior
substitute for the purely nominal adaptations of the auctioneer. All the more so,
since it is by no means clear whether and how the insufficiently specified market
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forces converge to the algebraically derived correct values of prices and wage
rates before unwarranted casualties happen. The move from an initial state to the
perfectly indifferent end state implies a Walrasian adaptation which is fundamentally
different from a market-forces adaptation.3 To bring about nominal changes by
moving around real quantities and people is comparatively less efficient. The present
inquiry is simplified, for the moment, by assuming Walrasian adaptations.
6 Case C: equal wage rates, different productivities and prices
The formal frame that is given with equations (9) to (12) remains almost the same.
The exception concerns the wage rates that are now assumed to be equal in both
regions. The quality of the products is identical, which is here indicated by a dot.
From (14) follow the market clearing prices as:
WA =WB =W ⇒ PA = WR•A
PB =
W
R•B
|t. (25)
If the productivity is higher in region M, i.e. R•A > R
•
B, then the price is lower,
i.e. PA < PB, and M is the high productivity–low price region. Accordingly, the
real wage in M is higher than in region N, i.e. W/PA >W/PB. Let us assume for
simplicity a relation of 2 to 1. Taken the real wages without regard to any other
considerations there exists an incentive for the workers to migrate from region N to
M. Put into a greater context, though, it is rational to stay in N if the differences in
working and living conditions outweigh the real wage differential. This is assumed
to be the case. Then, however, there remains the incentive of the inhabitants of N to
buy the qualitatively identical product in M at half price. When different currencies
are introduced and the exchange rate is set at 2 N/M this incentive vanishes. At this
exchange rate no transactions occur in the foreign exchange market.
We now merge the two regions. This calls for the equalization of the product
prices. From (2), (10) and (3) follows:
P? =
C
X
=
PA +PBϒ
1+ϒ
if ρX = 1, with C =CN +CM, X ≡ XA +XB, ϒ≡ R
•
B LB
R•A LA
≡ OB
OA
|t. (26)
If outputs are numerically equal in both regions, i.e. ϒ= 1, then the new market
clearing price is located exactly in the middle between the lower price of region M
3 “One of the most important aspects of a specific market format is the temporal pattern of price
setting; that market clearing takes time inherently violates the presumption that the entire target stock
will be sold at a unique price .... Far from being a fusty antiquarian issue, the controversy is still
relevant to the modern neoclassical fascination with the “law of one price” .... (Mirowski, 2004, p.
347). Niehans, for one, maintains to the contrary that both adjustment processes are complementary
instead of mutually exclusive (1994, p. 245).
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and the higher price of region N. In the general case, the new price is a weighted
average that depends on the relative outputs of the regions. The outputs can only
be equal if the smaller region, measured in labor input, has the higher productivity.
Then both regions have the same economic weight.
The price in M increases, i.e. P? > PA, the price in N decreases, i.e. P? < PB.
Real wages are no longer equal, they decrease in M, and increase in N. The inhab-
itants of M are momentarily worse off, and the inhabitants of N are momentarily
better off. Region N benefits from the higher productivity and the lower price in M.
Profit was hitherto zero for both firms. Equations (11) change to:
∆Q f iA ≡ P?XA−WLA
∆Q f iB ≡ P?XB−WLB |t. (27)
With a higher selling price firm A now makes a profit; firm B posts a loss because
its former selling price was higher. The business sector’s situation is inverse to that
of the household sector in each region. To restore the zero profit situation it follows
from (25) that the wage rates must change to:
W ?A = P
?R•A W
?
B = P
?R•B if ρXA = 1; ρXB = 1 |t. (28)
The new uniform market clearing price in combination with different productiv-
ities demands a wage rate differentiation. The wage rate rises in region M and falls
in N, i.e. W ?A >W and W
?
B <W . Thereafter the real wage in M is again higher than
in N, just as in the pre-merger situation. Total income remains unchanged. This can
be shown with the help of (28), (26) and (25):
Y ? =W ?A LA +W
?
B LB = Y. (29)
At the end of the day nothing has changed in real terms. Firms and households
alike are, without any economic blessings, at the same point on their respective
indifference curves, provided all nominal changes happen simultaneously.
7 Case D: comparative advantage
Each region consists now of both, a corn producer A and a cloth producer B. Region
M has a higher productivity in corn production, region N in the production of cloth.
The respective productivities are given by:
RMA RNA = αRMA α < 1 α = 12 corn
RMB RNB = βRMB β > 1 β = 2 cloth
|t. (30)
The productivity of corn production in region N is assumed to be half of that
in region M, yet the productivity of cloth production in region N is double of that
in region M. This concrete values facilitate the exposition, for the general case the
factors α and β may assume arbitrary values. What matters is that region M has
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a relative advantage in agrarian production and region N in industrial production.
The product qualities of corn and cloth are identical.
With wage rates initially set equal for all firms, profits (7) are differentiated as
follows:
∆Q f iMA = PMARMALMA
(
1− W
PMA RMA
)
if ρXMA = 1
∆Q f iMB = PMBRMBLMB
(
1− W
PMB RMB
)
if ρXMB = 1
∆Q f iNA = PNARNALNA
(
1− W
PNA RNA
)
if ρXNA = 1
∆Q f iNB = PNBRNBLNB
(
1− W
PNB RNB
)
if ρXNB = 1
|t. (31)
From this follow the market clearing prices for corn in region M and N, respec-
tively:
PMA =
W
RMA
PNA =
W
αRMA
PMA < PNA corn |t. (32)
The price of corn PMA in region M is half of that in region N.
By the same token the market clearing prices of cloth in both regions are given
by:
PMB =
W
RMB
PNB =
W
βRMB
PMB > PNB cloth |t. (33)
The price of cloth PMB in region M is double of that in region N. Corn is cheaper
in M, cloth is cheaper in N. Hence it is advantageous for the households of both
regions to buy all corn in M and all cloth in N. The situation is not behaviorally
stable unless the two regions are kept apart in one way or another. Let us suppose
that the exchange rate has been set at 2 N/M, then it is no longer advantageous for
the households in region N to buy corn in region M. The lower corn price in M
is compensated for by the exchange rate. However, the households in region M
now face an exchange rate of 0.5 M/N and a lower cloth price in region N. Their
incentive to buy cloth in region N quadruples. There is not one single exchange rate
that can level the price differentials between the regions. To keep them definitively
apart for the moment we therefore have to introduce transportation costs or tariffs
that compensate for the price differentials, such that trade is prevented and the
households keep on buying in their respective home regions.
Consumption expenditures (3) in both regions are given by:
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CM ≡ PMA XMA +PMB XMB
CN ≡ PNA XNA +PNB XNB |t. (34)
Wage incomes (1) in both regions are given by:
YM ≡W (LMA +LMB)
YN ≡W (LNA +LNB) |t. (35)
The household sectors’ budgets in both regions are balanced, i.e. ρEM = 1 and
ρEN = 1, the product markets are cleared and profits of all firms are zero.
We now merge the two regions. Inhabitants of M may freely enter the markets
of N, and vice versa. From (34) follows the uniform price in the corn market under
the aforementioned conditions as:
P?A =
PMA XMA +PNA XNA
XMA +XNA
=
PMA +PNAϒA
1+ϒA
if ρXA = 1 with ϒA ≡ α LNALMA
|t. (36)
If ϒA = 1 then P?A is a simple average, the new price is located exactly halfway
between the hitherto lower corn price in M and the higher price in N; otherwise (36)
yields a somewhat more sophisticated weighted average of the initial prices that
depends on the relative size of the firms and the productivity factor α .
Seen from the corn producer in M the new market clearing price P?A is above
the former regional price, i.e. P?A > PMA, that is, the corn producer in M makes a
profit. Seen from the corn producer in N the new market price is below the former
regional price, i.e. P?A < PNA, that is, the corn producer in N makes a loss.
From (34) follows the market clearing price in the cloth market as:
P?B =
PMB XMB +PNB XNB
XMB +XNB
=
PMB +PNBϒB
1+ϒB
if ρXB = 1 with ϒB ≡ β LNBLMB
|t. (37)
If ϒB = 1 then P?B is a simple average, otherwise it is a somewhat more sophisti-
cated weighted average of the initial prices that depends on the relative size of the
firms and the productivity factor β .
Seen from the cloth producer in M the new market price is below the former
regional price, i.e. P?B < PMB, that is, the cloth producer in M makes a loss. Seen
from the cloth producer in N the new market price is above the former regional
price, i.e. P?B > PNB, that is, the cloth producer in N makes a profit.
The market price equalization disrupts the zero profit situation. The firms with
the relatively high productivity now make a profit; the firms with the relatively low
productivity make a loss. Seen under the regional perspective one firm makes a
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profit and the other a loss. It is evident that this distribution of profits and losses
cannot last for long.
To restore the zero profit configuration the respective wage rates have to be
adapted. Analogous to (28) one gets for the corn producers
W ?MA = P
∗
A RMA W
?
NA = P
?
A RNA W
?
MA ↑ W ?NA ↓ (38)
and for the cloth producers
W ?MB = P
?
B RMB W
?
NB = P
?
B RNB W
?
MB ↓ W ?NB ↑ |t. (39)
The wage rate changes follow the price changes in each firm. The corn producing
workers in M earn more in nominal terms after the merger of the regional markets,
in N they earn less, and vice versa for the cloth producing workers.
The consumption expenditures in both regions, as compared to (34), are now
given by:
C?M ≡ P?A XMA +P?B XMB
C?N ≡ P?A XNA +P?B XNB
|t. (40)
The wage incomes in both regions, as compared to (35), are now given by:
Y ∗M ≡W ?MA LMA +W ?MB LMB
Y ?N ≡W ?NA LNA +W ?NB LNB
|t. (41)
Due to the zero profit condition the respective consumption expenditures and
wage costs are equal for each firm. From the zero profit condition in combination
with (31) follow the real wages of the workers in the two firms of region M:
W ?MA
P∗A
= RMA if ρXMA = 1
W ?MB
P∗B
= RMB if ρXMB = 1 |t. (42)
In the same manner follow the real wages of the workers in the two firms of
region N:
W ?NA
P∗A
= RNA if ρXNA = 1
W ?NB
P∗B
= RNB if ρXNB = 1 |t. (43)
Since all productivities remain unchanged, the real wages in all firms remain
unchanged, too. The merger of the two regions ultimately leaves the workers
unaffected in real terms. And since the profits in all firms are zero before and after
the merger all agents stay put at the same position on their respective indifference
curves. Nobody gains or looses because of the integration of product markets –
provided wage rates are adapted in both directions. Wage cuts alone are inadequate.
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In order to achieve real improvements, overall productivity increases are re-
quired. With given productivities in each firm, this in turn calls for more specializa-
tion and a reallocation of the given total labor input among firms. The integration of
product markets that is accompanied by appropriate wage rate adaptations in both
directions by itself has no real effect whatsoever, only a more profound division of
labor has.
There are, however, changes of nominal incomes. From (41) and (42) follows:
Y ?M ≡WMA LMA
P?A
PMA︸︷︷︸
>1
+WMB LMB
P?B
PMB︸︷︷︸
<1
|t. (44)
The previous wage incomes in region M are now increased or decreased by a
factor that depends on the relation of the new to the former market clearing prices.
Hence the new wage income of the corn producing workers is higher than before
and that of the cloth producing workers shrinks
The numerical value of the first price relation in (44) follows from (36)
P?A
PMA
=
1+
PNA
PMA
α
LNA
LMA
1+α
LNA
LMA
if ρXA = 1 |t. (45)
Likewise for the second price relation. The countervailing income changes in
both firms as given by (44) do not cancel out exactly. By consequence, total nominal
income in region M changes. Likewise for region N. These income changes, though,
do not affect the real wages which stay put, as we have seen earlier. Since the overall
expenditure ratio is unity consumption expenditures move in step with income.
The new terms of trade follow from (36) and (37) as:
ρ?Θ ≡
P?A
P∗B
⇒ ρ?Θ =
PMA +PNAϒA
PMB +PNBϒB
1+ϒB
1+ϒA
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 ϒA ≡ α LNALMA , ϒB ≡ β
LNB
LMB
|t.
(46)
After the substitution of prices by (32) and (33) this reduces to:
ρ?Θ =
RMB
RMA
(
1+
LNA
LMA
)
(
1+α
LNA
LMA
)
(
1+β
LNB
LMB
)
(
1+
LNB
LMB
)
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t.
(47)
The new terms of trade depend on the inverse productivities RMA and RMB, the
relative size of firms measured in labor inputs, and the productivity factors which in
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turn define the comparative advantages.4 If the comparative advantages vanish, i.e.
α = 1; β = 1, the corn producers A, as well as the cloth producers B, are identical
and the terms of trade are equal to the inverse productivities in the two lines of
production. It has to be emphasized that the terms of trade are objectively given and
in no way dependent on subjective idiosyncrasies. All structural axiomatic variables
are measurable in principle.
The real wages are the same as in the initial situation but, to recall, they were
different among firms then. This leaves us with a possible incentive for the workers
to move from low-real-wage firms to high-real-wage firms. This incentive, though,
is of no consequence if it is compensated for by countervailing differentials in
working and living conditions.
8 Full specialization
It is assumed now that both regions focus on their comparative advantages, that
is, region M allocates all available labor input to corn production and region N to
cloth production. This entails that the workers in region M move voluntarily from
firm B to firm A. This move is motivated by the higher real wage in firm A and
accompanied by a net increase of total wage income in region M. Firm B vanishes
in the process, which may entail second round effects like the devaluation of former
investments or of real estate. Likewise for region N.
The financial profits of the two remaining firms are then given by:
∆Q f iMA ≡ P◦MAXMA−W ?MALMA
∆Q f iNB ≡ P◦NBXNB−W ?NBLNB
|t. (48)
From the zero profit condition follow the market clearing prices as:
P◦MA =
W ?MA
RMA
P◦NB =
W ?NB
RNB
|t. (49)
From this in turn follow the terms of trade:
ρ◦Θ ≡
P◦MA
P◦NB
⇒ ρ◦Θ ≡
W ?MA
W ?NB
RNB
RMA
|t. (50)
This is the same relation as (17) in Case A. Both cases are structurally identical.
By substituting (42) and (43) we finally arrive at:
P◦MA
P◦NB
=
P?A
P?B
|t. (51)
In the limiting case of full specialization the terms of trade are equal to the terms
of trade in the general Case D. Under full specialization larger quantities are traded
4 This is a variant of the structural value theorem. For details see (2011b, pp. 5-7).
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but they exchange in the same relation, that is, region M gives up larger quantities
of corn and obtains larger quantities of cloth. The higher real wage in both regions
translates into larger quantities of both products. Full specialization, though, does
not lead to better terms of trade for one region or the other. This results holds under
the condition that the productivities remain constant.
If full specialization is, in addition, conductive to increasing returns, then it must
occur in both firms in the same proportion, otherwise the terms of trade improve for
the region with the comparatively smaller productivity increases.
It is therefore not precisely to the point to speak of the gains from trade as
Ricardo (1981, p. 128) and J. S. Mill (2004, p. 8) already noted. The real gain
originates in the sphere of production. The overall quantitative increases and the
higher real wages in both regions are due to the intensification of the division of
labor, which in turn presupposes deep going structural changes. The interlocked
effects of: (a) specialization on the production line with a relatively high produc-
tivity, (b) larger quantitative trade volumes that come along with more resource
consumption in transportation, (c) structural monoculture, and (d) intensified mutual
dependencies have to be weighted against each other in order to determine the over-
all net gain. An obvious alternative to full specialization is to boost productivities in
the comparatively weak production lines. This amounts to setting the productivity
factors in (29) to unity.
By positing an expenditure ratio of unity and a distributed profit ratio of zero we
have confined the analysis to the elementary zero profit case. Under the condition of
zero profit business is entirely indifferent to the higher degree of specialization. The
gains from specialization and trade therefore take the form of higher real wages in
both regions. The structural axiom set of course contains also the the more complex
general case of overall positive profits. All that is necessary is to allow for an
expenditure ratio greater one and a distributed profit ratio greater zero. This analysis
is left for another occasion.
9 Factor immobility between regions
Case A is once more the point of departure. It is assumed now that the partitioning
of consumption expenditures shifts in favor of product A. This led in case A to the
reallocation of labor input from the region that produces the less preferred output
to the region that produces the more preferred output. Now the migration of labor
input from region N to region M is excluded. Two possible ways of adaptation to
the new situation are considered: (a) the price mechanism and (b) the reallocation
of labor input within region N.
9.1 The exchange rate mechanism
The initial partitioning of the given total consumption expenditures C0 changes as
follows:
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C0 =CM0 +CN0 → CN1 =C0−CM1
CM1 >CM0 → CN1 <CN0. (52)
Consumption expenditures increase in region M and decrease by the same
amount in region N, that is, the inhabitants of N spend part of their incomes in
region M. Total income Y remains unchanged and is equal to (9). The partitioning of
labor input between the two regions remains unchanged. With given productivities
the respective output quantities remain unchanged, too.
Given this conditions, the market clearing price of product A must rise according
to (3)
P?A1 =
CM1
XA0
if ρXA1 = 1. (53)
and analogous for region N
P?B1 =
CN1
XB0
if ρXB1 = 1 (54)
where the market clearing price must fall.
Profit was initially zero in both firms. Due to the price changes we have now:
∆Q f iA1 ≡ P?A1XA0−WA0 LA0
∆Q f iB1 ≡ P?B1XB0−WB0 LB0.
(55)
Firm A now makes a profit and firm B a loss. We can rewrite the new consump-
tion expenditures CM1 as the sum of initial consumption expenditures of region M
and additional expenditures of region N
CM1 ≡CM0 +CAN1
CN1 ≡CN0−CAN1 (56)
and analogous for the new consumption expenditures of region N. From (55)
then follows:
∆Q f iA1 ≡CAN1
∆Q f iB1 ≡−CAN1
with CM0 =WA0LA0, CN0 =WB0LB0.
(57)
The profit of region M is equal to its exports. The loss of region N is equal
to its imports. This configuration is clearly not reproducible over a longer time
span. What has to be done is to counteract the demand shift by an appropriate price
increase. This works if the consumers react to a price increase with a cutback of
consumption expenditures CM.
The price elasticity of consumption expenditures is defined as:
εCP ≡
...
CM...
PA
≡
CM−CM1
CM1
PA−P?A1
P?A1
. (58)
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This can be rewritten with the help of (53) as:
CM ≡CM1− εCP (PA−P?A1)XA0. (59)
If the price PA is above the actual market clearing price P?A1 then consumption
expenditures CM are below the current consumption expenditures CM1 provided the
elasticity εCP is > 0. We are looking for the price P◦A that reduces CM again to CM0.
From (59) follows:
P◦A = P
?
A1 +
1
εCPXA0
(CM1−CM0)
if CM =CM0.
(60)
From this limiting price follows the appropriate exchange rate as:
χ◦N/M ≡
P◦A
PA0
. (61)
By substituting (60) this finally gives:
χ◦N/M ≡
P?A1
PA0
(
1+
1
εCP
)
− 1
εCP
. (62)
The exchange rate that neutralizes the demand shift depends on the relation of
the market clearing prices after and before the demand shift and the price elasticity
of consumption expenditures. If the elasticity is infinite the exchange rate is equal to
the relation of the market clearing prices. At this exchange rate there occurs neither
supply nor demand and by consequence no transaction in the foreign exchange
market.5 Each region buys again its own product and profits are again zero. This
configuration is in principle reproducible for an indefinite time span. The exchange
rate, however, indicates a latent real demand for product A.
9.2 Domestic reallocation of labor input
It is now assumed that firm A reacts to the additional demand from region N with
an expansion of output and employment. Conversely, firm B cuts back employment.
The respective prices remain unaltered. The new labor inputs follow from (3), (2)
and the market clearing condition as:
LA1 =
CM1
PA0RA0
if ρXA = 1
LB1 =
CN1
PB0RB0
if ρBA = 1.
(63)
5 In the familiar terminology one could say that the demand and supply schedules should intersect
exactly on the y-axis.
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If there was full employment in each region in the initial period then we have now
overemployment in region M since from CM1 >CM0 follows LA1 > LA0. Conversely,
region N now experiences underemployment and has a strong motive to change the
situation.
Since factor movements between the regions are ruled out by assumption region
N cannot export unemployment. Hence the only possibility that is left under the
given conditions is to build up a firm C in region N with the same productivity
as firm A. This firm absorbs the unemployed and produces the output that is now
more preferred than product B. The increased demand for product A is thereby
satisfied and full employment is restored in both regions. This solution, although
economically perfectly satisfactory, is not exactly in the spirit of the classical free
trade doctrine. After the reallocation of labor input in region N there is no trade
between the regions. No trade, though, is only a special case of balanced trade. And
balanced trade is the condition for longer term reproducibility. An export-surplus in
one region redistributes the profit of the world economy as a whole according to
(57). Only in the ideal case of a balanced current account foreign trade makes no
difference with regard to reproducibility.
10 Summary
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three nonbehavioral axioms as groundwork for the
consistent real and nominal analysis of foreign trade.
Four cases with increasing complexity are considered under the objective con-
ditions of market clearing, budget balancing and initial zero profit of all firms in
a pure consumption economy. Two regions are at first taken in isolation and then
merged. Depending on the initial configuration of regional productivities, wage
rates, and prices the merger leads to a structural adaptation of product prices and
wage rates. The main results for the classical case of comparative advantages are:
• Since all productivities remain unaffected by the merger the real wages in all
firms remain unchanged. And since the profits in all firms are zero before and
after the merger all agents stay put at the same position on their respective
indifference curves. Nobody gains or looses because of the integration of
product markets – provided wage rates are adapted in both directions.
• The firms with a relatively low productivity must accept price reductions
while its workers must accept simultaneous wage rate reductions. The firms
with a relatively high productivity must accept simultaneous price and wage
rate increases. Partial wage rate increases are as indispensable as partial wage
rate reductions.
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• The real gains from full specialization and trade accrue, in the zero profit
consumption economy, exclusively to the workers.
• In the case of a demand shift for the two products of two regions three options
are available: (a) the reallocation of labor input between the regions, (b) the
implementation of an exchange rate that perfectly neutralizes the demand
shift, (c) the build-up of a new firm that absorbs the demand shift within the
region that is adversely affected by it. Measures (b) and (c) maintain full
employment in both regions and prevent a profit redistribution between the
regions.
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